D. Samet theory and game theory. Such, for example, are models in which agents are informed by observing a random variable with infinitely many values, or models in which agents are of infinitely many types.
RT Information Structures
Let f2 be a state space with a a-field s We define a reflexive transitive (R T) information structure to be a function P: f]--,E which satisfies for each co in f2: ogeP(og),
for each
og, ~p(og), p(og,)cp(og).
(2) P(o9) is interpreted as the set of all states which are considered possible to the agent when state o9 is realized. The relation 'o9' is possible at o9' is reflexive and transitive by (1) and (2). These properties can be shown to be equivalent to the claims that whatever is known by the agent is true, and that the agent always knows that he knows a fact, when this is the case (see [3] , [4] ). If we require that the possibility relation is also symmetric then P represents a partition, that is, the range of P is a partition of f]. We call P finite when its range is finite. We say that P is finitely nested if there is no infinite sequence in the range of P that is strictly decreasing with respect to inclusion. Consider now two agents 1 and 2, with information structures P1 and P2 respectively. We say that event E is common knowledge at o9 if there exists some event C such that o9 ~ C c_E and for each og'e C, P~(o9')c_ C for i = 1,2. When the range of P is a partition, this definition is equivalent to the one given in [1] . See also [3] and [4] for equivalent definitions of common knowledge in terms of iterated knowledge operators.
Agreeing to Disagree in Infinite RT Information Structures
Suppose the agents have a common prior probability distribution p over Z. For a given event X and number r let Ei(X, r) for i= 1,2, be the event that the posterior probability that agent i assigns to X is r, i.e., Ei(X, r)= { o9[p (X[ P;(o9))= r}.
We can now state a general theorem, for RT structures, about the impossibility of agreeing to disagree.
Proposition 1. If P~ and P2 are finitely nested RT information structures with a countable range, and for some event X and numbers r and s, E~ (X, r)c~E2(X, s) is common knowledge at some state, then r= s.
A similar theorem is proved in [4] for a model in which the information structures Pi are derived from propositional knowledge operatiors. If we assume in this model that knowledge acquired by an agent, even if it is infinite, is a logical consequence of finitely many propositions, then the countability and the finite nestedness of the derived information structures is guaranteed. The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to that given in [,~]. Note that finite information structures are trivially finitely nested and of countable range, and therefore the proposition holds for them.
Proposition 2. The claim of Proposition 1 does not hold in general for infinite RT information structures even when the ranges are countable.
Proof." We construct an example with two agents in which both information structures are countable though one of them is not finitely nested, and where a disagreement of the agents about the prior of a given event X is common knowledge. Let f~ be the unit interval [0,1] and p the Lebesgue measure on it. We define two RTinformation structures P~ and Pz and an event X as follows.
The information structure P2 is trivial: P2(09) = f~ for all 09. The event X will be constructed such that p(X)= 89 for some d> 0, and therefore for each 09:
The information structure P1 will be chosen such that for each coef~:
Before we construct X and P1 formally we give a sketch of the construction. Suppose we define P1(09)=[0,~) for each 09e[0,1) and P1(09)=( 89 for each 09e(~, 1]. We choose X such that We define the information structure P1 as follows: For a~eA}, P, (~o) = c}.
P(XI [O, 1))=P(X[(2,1])=I-3d,
Since {Aj[i_ 1, j= 1 ..... ni} is a partition of f~, the information structure P1 is defined for all ~o and it is easy to see that P1 is an R T information structure. To demonstrate that 1 and 2 can agree to disagree with these information structures we construct an event X such that at each o9 the posteriors of 1 and 2 are different and yet are common knowledge. To evaluate the series on the right hand side of (5) we observe that for each k> 1 nkt~ = tk-1 + tk. 
Ez(X, 89
is common knowledge but 1 # ~-d, and thus it is possible to agree to disagree in f2.
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